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Human Excellence and the Body Politic: 
Socratic Education as Reliever of the Tension 
WILLIAM B. CODY 
Clemson University 
The problematic relationship between the political community and its 
outstanding individuals is certainly as old as political communities 
themselves. It is possible that men living outside of some political community 
may avoid the problem, but, as long as there are communities which seek 
the common good and individuals who may be distinguished from others 
due to their talents or achievements, there will exist a problem of how to do 
justice to both the community and to those who excel. This relationship has 
been addressed by political philosophers in all periods of history. These 
political philosophers have approached the problem from various angles 
but none has managed to completely avoid the issue. 
Different approaches to the problem may be identified by reference to 
the fundamental questions which the philosophers pose with regard to 
outstanding individuals. In fact, the way that the question is asked fre-
quently supplies the answer or at least some important implications for the 
answerer. Some questions related to the problem are: What is the place of 
the outstanding individual in the political community? What does the ex-
cellent one owe to the community? What does the community owe to the 
outstanding ones? What must the community tolerate from these in-
dividuals? What must these individuals tolerate from the community? The 
above questions or similar ones have been addressed by Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and virtually all others who have been considered 
political philosophers. It would not be out of place to mention that similar 
questions have been addressed by the political thinkers of China as well. 
The problem is truly a universal one for those who are concerned with either 
good government, the good of the community, or excellence. It is difficult, 
although perhaps not impossible, to conceive of an intelligent human being 
who does not fall into at least one of these categories. 
The founder of political philosophy was also deeply concerned about 
the relationship between the polis, his political community, and excellent in-
dividuals . Socrates, the man whom Cicero said called philosophy down 
from the heavens, devoted his life to making the excellent young men of the 
polis of Athens safe for the community and making the democracy which 
flourished in that polis safe for them. From all accounts of his life Socrates 
was preoccupied with the outstanding young men of Athens and spent most 
of his time engaged in dialogue with them. The thesis of this essay is that the 
time he spent with them was in pursuit of solving the problem of how a 
polis, especially a democratic one, might peacefully coexist with her ex-
cellent young men without resulting in the destruction of either. Learning 
the facts of Socrates' life, much less his true beliefs, is extremely difficult, 
since he never wrote. We are left to rely on the accounts of others who were 
either his friends or his students. Because of this closeness between Socrates 
and our sources of information about his life and beliefs, we must realize 
that the picture we receive is more literary than historical and, therefore, 
may be idealized to a certain extent. However, that should not discourage 
us, since an idealized view, if true' to the general facts, may make it simpler 
for us to find the most important themes in both the life and thought of 
Socrates. Most of our knowledge of Socrates comes from two of his 
students, Plato and Xenophon, and from his friend Aristophanes, the Athe-
nian writer of comedic plays. 
This study will focus on Platonic Socrates, as distinguished from 
Xenophonic Socrates or Aristophanean Socrates. It is Plato's account of 
Socrates with which most are familiar today. He is the writer whose Socratic 
writings have been most widely read. Through an examination of some of 
Plato's writings on Socrates this paper will focus on Socrates' approach to 
the problem of the relationship between the polis and the outstanding in-
dividual. To a lesser extent the paper will examine the Socratic way of life as 
a solution to the problem. Again the focus will be on the life of Socrates as 
presented by Plato rather than on particular speeches delivered by Socrates 
in the course of a Platonic dialogue. However, it will be necessary to refer to 
the speeches of Socrates on some occasions in order to try to understand the 
character as he is presented by Plato. Although Plato wrote over 20 
dialogues dealing with Socrates, the investigation in this paper will center on 
three of those dialogues: The Apology of Socrates, The Republic, and The 
Gorgias. These dialogues represent the heart of the Platonic literature on 
the questions at hand, although they are certainly not exhaustive with 
regard to the topic. 
The corpus of Platonic writings on Socrates present a portrait of a man 
who eschews the spotlight of politics and public affairs in order to spend his 
time engaged in conversation or dialogue with the brightest young men of 
Athens. From all accounts Socrates avoids conversations with the old of the 
city just as assiduously as he pursues the company of the young. In addi-
tion, he avoids the many, or the demos, who are the rulers of _the 
Athenian democracy. In fact, he steers clear of public life in general except 
when compelled to take part in his civic duty by the polis of Athens. He also 
is reluctant to become involved with the rhetoricians and sophists who 
abound in the city. These men make their livings flattering the many on the 
one hand and teaching those who are willing to pay to learn how to deceive 
the many, or demos, on the other hand. One time he is compelled to address 
the demos is at his trial where he is charged with corrupting the youth of 
Athens and with being the worst of the sophists. He is obliged to defend his 
life before the people of Athens by presenting his apology or defense in a 
court of law. 
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Why does Socrates devote his life to the young men of Athens? What is 
his fascination with these outstanding young men? Even if we assume that 
he was unaware of the serious consequences that this infatuation would 
have for him personally (it did lead to his being sentenced to death), what 
drew him to them? In order to answer this question it is necessary to turn to 
the Socratic notions of education and philosophy presented by Plato. The 
most extensive handling of these topics in the corpus of the Platonic 
literature can be found in the second half of The Republic. In the first half 
of The Republic Socrates constructs a "city in speech" in order to address 
the question of justice posed to him by some of the youths of Athens. This 
"city in speech" represents an imaginary polis which Socrates puts forth as 
the most just city we can conceive. It is purely imaginary as we are repeatedly 
told (by reference to many impossible features contained within it). Socrates 
indicates that this "city in speech" could not possibly come into existence in 
reality except by pure chance, an extraordinarily unlikely occurrence. For 
Socrates the most unrealistic feature of this "city in speech" composed of 
many impossible features is that it will be governed by philosophers or 
philosopher-kings. 
If this city is to keep itself supplied with an ample number of 
philosophers to provide good government, it will have to devise a system of 
education for those who are fit to be philosophers and, therefore, rulers in 
this "city in speech." This philosophical education will not be given to all in 
the "city in speech" but only to those whose souls make them fit to be 
philosophers. In Book VI of The Republic Socrates posits the idea that only 
certain types of men and women, or, to be more exact, certain types of souls 
are capable of becoming philosophers (Republic, 484a-d). 2 Since this is 
true, it follows that ::>nly those with this particular type of soul are fit to be 
educated as rulers for the best of cities. What are the characteristics of the 
souls of these potential philosophers? Socrates states that the souls of the 
potential philosophers all possess three important characteristics. First of 
all, these souls hate that which is false and cherish that which is the truth 
(Republic, 485c). Secondly, a soul that is fit for philosophy will be moderate 
and have no love of money or the many things with which money is 
associated. However, in conjunction with this moderation the excellent soul 
will be neither illiberal or cowardly (Republic, 485e-486b). Obviously, 
philosophy is not to be pursued by those who are not exceptionally quick 
studies, for in order to reach the depths of philosophy one must traverse the 
shallows quickly or be doomed never to escape them. Socrates summarizes 
the philosophic soul at the end of this section of The Republic: 
Is there any way, then, in which you could blame a practice like this 
that a man could never adequately pursue if he were not by nature a 
good rememberer, a good learner, magnificent, charming, and a friend 
and kinsman of truth, justice, courage and moderation?" (Republic, 
487a). 3 
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These special souls then are the only ones that should be admitted to par-
take of the philosophic education that will be offered the future rulers of the 
"city in speech." 
Those who have these talents or attributes of the soul are the excellent 
and need to be educated to philosophy not only for their own good but for 
the good of the polis, as will be explained below. Those souls which are 
capable of being taken to true philosophy through proper education also 
have a need to be taken there, as will, hopefully, become clear in what is to 
follow. A particular problem arises because the polis, certainly any but the 
best polis, the "city in speech," and especially the democratic polis of 
Athens, corrupts the best souls and pulls them away from philosophy in-
stead of steering them toward the love of wisdom. These inferior regimes or 
cities corrupt the best souls by failing to nurture them through the proper 
education. These regimes direct or point the best souls toward lower goals 
than wisdom and virtue (Republic, 491 b-e). 
This misdirection creates a very serious problem for both the excellent 
souls and the cities, since those capable of attaining the highest good, 
philosophy, are also capable of reaching the greatest evil, tyranny. As 
Socrates explains it, these souls which are equipped to be the greatest 
achievers of justice and virtue are also capable of becoming the sources of 
the greatest injustice and villainy: 
"So I suppose it is reasonable that the best nature comes off worse 
than an ordinary one from an inappropriate rearing." 
"Yes, it is." 
"Won't we say for souls too, Adeimantus," I said, "that, similarly, 
those with the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get 
bad instruction? Or do you suppose an ordinary nature is the source of 
great injustices and unmixed villainy? Don't you suppose, rather, that 
it's a lusty one corrupted by its rearing, while a weak nature will never 
be the cause of great things either good or bad?" (Republic, 491d-e) 
Outstanding souls have courage, moderation, beauty, wealth, strength of 
body, and charm which can be used for the greatest good or evil. 
Any but the best of cities accomplishes the corruption of the best souls 
by both flattery and the nurturing of false beliefs in the excellent soul. These 
false beliefs are nurtured not only by the many of the polis but also by the 
poets of the polis. Both the poets and the many regale the excellent soul with 
tales that glorify evil actions committed by gods and demigods. These 
stories depict those who are most worthy of honor as reaching petty goals 
through the use of treachery and deceit. Treachery and deceit are described 
as the ways of attaining the highest goals. While heralding the value of less 
than admirable methods, the demos and the poets of the polis are also guilty 
of prescribing the wrong ends for the best of souls as well. The polis, par-
ticularly the demos in Athens, commends the best soul as being the greatest 
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of all and worthy of the highest honors, but then denies to the best souls in 
the name of democracy those honors he is told he deserves. In addition, the 
many teach the most excellent soul that he should strive after that which the 
many hold to be most high: money, power, fame, and the like. These goals 
are substituted for what the best souls should seek-virtue and wisdom. 
These best of souls are deceived into believing that they may have that 
which they may not have in a polis, at least in a democratic polis such as 
Athens. The best of men possessed of the best of souls are used by the 
demos and by their relatives until they try to attain that which they have 
been Jed to believe they deserve. Frustrated by the city, they seek to gain 
what they deserve by the methods they have been taught to respect: 
treachery and deceit. When their deceits are exposed or their ends finally 
revealed these best of souls are cast from the polis and excellence is given yet 
another black mark on the ledger of the demos. 
When Socrates turns to the discussion of education, he indicates that it 
is not what the many believe it to be-giving the soul something which it has 
not got. Education consists of turning the soul, at least the most excellent 
soul, away from the false goals which the polis prescribes for it toward the 
one true goal, the love of wisdom. True education of the best sorts of souls 
is turning the soul away from the tastes of the many, and toward the pursuit 
of wisdom. Education, then, is that art of turning souls toward virtue: 
"There would, therefore," I said, "be an art of this turning 
around, concerned with the way in which this power can most easily 
and efficiently be turned around, not an art of producing sight in it. 
Rather, this art takes as given that sight is there, but not rightly turned 
nor looking at what it ought to look at, and accomplishes this object." 
(Republic, 518d) 
For Socrates education does not put sight in the eye of the soul as many 
claim; it merely turns the soul so that its eye may focus clearly on virtue and 
wisdom. 
Since the sight of the eye of the excellent soul far exceeds the sight of 
the average or normal soul Uust as all the qualities of the excellent soul ex-
ceed those of the average soul), having its sight focused on vice rather than 
virtue leads to very serious consequences for both the polis and the excellent 
soul: 
"Therefore, the other virtues of a soul, as they are called, are 
probably somewhat close to those of the body. For they are really not 
there beforehand and are later produced by habits and exercises, while 
the virtue of exercising prudence is more than anything somehow more 
divine, it seems; it never loses its power, but according to the way it is 
turned, it becomes useful and helpful or, again, useless and harmful. 
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Or haven't you yet reflected about the men who are said to be vicious 
but wise, how shrewdly their petty soul sees and how sharply it 
distinguishes those things toward which it is turned, showing that it 
doesn't have poor vision although it is compelled to serve vice; so that 
the sharper it sees, the more evil it accomplishes?" 
"Most certainly," he said. 
"However," I said, "if this part of such a nature were trimmed in 
earliest childhood and its ties of kinship with becoming were cut 
off-like leaden weights, which eating and such pleasures as well as 
their refinements naturally attach to the soul and turn its vision 
downward-if, I say, it were rid of them and turned around toward the 
true things, this same part of the same human beings would also see 
them most sharply, just as it does those things toward which it is now 
turned." 
(Republic, 518d-519b). 
Once again Socrates tells us that the same souls which are suited for 
philosophy are also suited for tyranny. The potential philosophers are the 
same as the potential tyrants! The only difference between the tyrant and 
the true philosopher is that the soul of the former is turned toward vice 
while the soul of the latter is turned toward virtue. 
The business of turning souls from vice to virtue is indeed a most 
serious one for the polis. It is the difference between philosophy and the 
possibility of tyranny. However, it is also a very necessary, if dangerous, 
task if the polis is to remain free from despotic rule. It is a dangerous task 
because the one who undertakes it runs the risk of being branded the mentor 
of tyrants, if he is not completely successful in turning the souls of his 
pupils. Such was the fate of Socrates! Of the students of Socrates of whom 
we have knowledge we know that he had both successes and failures in the 
turning of souls. Among his reputed successes must be numbered the two 
philosophers Plato and Xenophon. His reputed failures would include 
Alcibiades, the outstanding Athenian general of the Peloponnesian War, 
who was ruined by his own ambition, and Critias, who was to become one 
of the infamous Thirty Tyrants of Athens. 
The alleged failures of Socrates were to play an important role in his 
trial and death. One of the major charges leveled against Socrates at his 
trial, as we are told in the Apology of Socrates, was corrupting the youth of 
Athens. In other words, his attraction to the most excellent young souls of 
the polis proved eventually to be fatal to Socrates, although not until he 
reached the age of 70. He is charged with corrupting the youth of Athens 
because some of the excellent young souls with whom he was frequently 
seen were the leading contemnors of the Athenian demos. In fact, as was 
mentioned above, Critias was actually able to subvert the power of many in 
Athens during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. The Apology of Socrates, 
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which will be discussed in greater detail below, is Plato's description of the 
trial of Socrates and the way in which Socrates "defends" himself against 
the charges brought against him. Allan Bloom claims that the true apology 
or defense of Socrates is presented in The Repulbic• where Socrates explains 
why he has led the life he has led and where he explains the significance of 
the turning of souls. While there is certainly a great deal of truth in what 
Professor Bloom says, it would seem that the ultimate apology of Socrates 
exists in the persons and writings of Plato and Xenophon and the others 
whom Socrates was successful in turning toward philosophy. That apology 
is an ongoing defense that is still having an effect today, at least it is less 
than noble to deny that as a possibility. 
In another Platonic dialogue, the Phaedrus, Socrates and his compan-
ion, Phaedrus, pause to take shelter from the sun under the platanos tree. 
While under the shelter of the platanos the men engage in a philosophical 
discussion. It is no mere coincidence that the name of the tree is so similar to 
the name of the author of the dialogue. Just as the tree shades Socrates and 
Phaedrus, Plato shelters philosophy and, therefore, provides for its con-
tinuation after the life of Socrates has ended and, as it turns out, for 
millenia after the death of Plato himself. It should also be noted here that it 
is doubtful that Socrates believed that political philosophy could have ever 
existed in any place other than Athens, or a place like Athens-a 
democracy. Other types of regimes refuse to allow philosophy to enter into 
their gates. The action of the Phaedrus takes place outside the city walls of 
Athens, and we may, therefore, infer that Plato not only provides a suitable 
shelter for the continuation of philosophy in time but also makes it possible 
for philosophy to venture out beyond the confines of democracies and still 
survive. What greater defense of Socrates can there be than that he and his 
successors have given the gift of philosophy to the Western world? They 
have made the love of wisdom a possibility for those whom most polities 
would corrupt or at least divert. 
One additional preliminary is necessary before turning to a discussion 
of Plato's Apology of Socrates: we must distinguish Socrates from another 
group of 'teachers' who thrived in Athens during the fifth century B.C. This 
other group of teachers was known as sophists or rhetoricians. Unlike 
Socrates, these men charged for their services, and their lessons consisted of 
teaching the young men of Athens the art of speechmaking. Techniques of 
persuasion were provided so that these young men would be able to win 
their points with the many (the rulers of Athenian democracy) in both the 
law court and the legislative assembly. These sophists were unconcerned 
with philosophy or the pursuit of virtue; they were only interested in win-
ning victories through rhetoric . Much like the lawyers of the present day 
these men were not concerned with right and wrong or truth and falseness. 
Power and control were their only goals, although wealth could help them 
attain these goals and, therefore, was frequently seen as another worthwhile 
pursuit. 
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In the terminology used in The Republic these sophists were the false 
philosophers who the many confuse with the true philosophers. The source 
of the confusion arises from the fact that these false philosophers appear to 
use the same techniques of investigation as the true philosophers-speeches 
and dialogues. However, these false philosophers are not generally of the 
best sort of souls, and, when they are, their souls have not been turned 
toward the good. Again, these ~ophis.t~ taught techniques and methods and 
were not concerned with the use to which these skills were put. Their field 
was the techniques of persuasion and political control through speech . 
These men became the mortal enemies of Socrates, and they were most 
awesome and deadly foes, indeed. Although they were his enemies, the 
sophists accused Socrates of doing what they themselves were, in fact, guilty 
of: teaching manipulation of the many through the use of speech to the 
youth and, thereby, corrupting them. 
Perhaps the fullest treatment of these sophists by Plato appears in the 
dialogue entitled Gorgias. This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates 
and Gorgias, one of the most famous of all the sophists. Other participants 
in this dialogue are Chaerephon, a young follower of Socrates, and Callicles 
and Polus, two other sophists . The dialogue in many ways demonstrates the 
differences between philosophers and sophists. It also helps to explain why 
the sophists were so opposed to Socrates-he was capable of exposing them 
for what they were. At the opening of the dialogue Socrates has been 
brought by Chaerephon to hear Gorgias speak. However, the two arrive too 
late for the public oration and rather than settle for a simple declamation 
from Gorgias Socrates wants Gorgias to explain to him what it is he teaches, 
as he explains to Callicles: 
But do you suppose he would be willing just to talk with us? What 
I really want is to learn from him the power of his art, and what it is he 
professes to teach. The rest of his performance he may, as you suggest, 
deliver at some other time (Gorgias, 447c) ' 
With some 'help' from Socrates Gorgias is able to explain what it is he 
teaches: 
Gorg. I mean the ability to persuade with words judges in the law 
courts, senators in the Senate, assemblymen in the Assembly, and men 
in any other meeting which convenes for the public interest. Since it is 
perfectly true that by virtue of this power you will have at your beck 
and call the physician and the trainer, that businessman of yours will 
turn out to be making money for somebody else! Not for himself will 
he make it, but for you who have the power to speak and persuade the 
vast majority. 
Socr. At this moment, Gorgias, you seem to have come very close 
to defining what sort of art you consider rhetoric to be. If I understand 
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you at all, you mean that rhetoric produces persuasion. Its entire 
business is persuasion; the whole sum and substance of it comes to 
that. Can you, in fact, declare that rhetoric has any further power than 
to effect persuasion in the listeners' soul? 
Gorg. No, I can't, Socrates; you seem to me to be giving an ade-
quate definition. This is really its sum and substance. (Gorgias, 
452e-453a) 
Socrates then manages to get Gorgias to admit that his art is limited to per-
suasion and that he is ignorant of other arts, although through his speeches 
he can persuade the many that they should listen to him with regard to the 
other arts rather than those who are really knowledgeable in those arts. 
Socrates, having exacted these concessions, then strikes at the heart of 
the matter when he asks Gorgias what happens if a student should come to 
him ignorant of the difference between good and evil: 
For the moment let us rather consider this point: Is the rhetori-
cian's equipment the same in regard to justice and injustice, beauty and 
ugliness, good and evil, as it is regarding health and the several subjects 
of the other arts? Is it, in fact, true that he does not really know what is 
good or evil, beautiful or ugly, just or unjust, but has devised a means 
of persuasion about them so that, in the eyes of the ignorant, he seems 
to know more than the actual possessor of knowledge though he does 
not really do so? Or is it necessary for him to know? Must the man who 
intends to learn rhetoric have acquired this knowledge before he comes 
to you? And if he hasn't, will you, the teacher of rhetoric, teach him 
none of these things (of course that's not really your job), but instead 
will you make him, in the eyes of the crowd, seem to know such things, 
though he doesn't, and seem to be good, though he isn't? Or is it a fact 
that you will not be able to teach him rhetoric at all until he first learns 
the truth about these matters? What is really the situation in such cases, 
Gorgias? For heaven's sake, strip the veil off rhetoric, as you promised 
to do, and tell us what on earth its power may be! 
Gorg. Why, Socrates, it is my opinion that if a pupil does not hap-
pen to know these things, he will learn them, as well as rhetoric, from 
me. (Gorgias, 459d-460a) 
From this point on Socrates has Gorgias and the other sophists where he 
wants them. Initially, he continues with the claim that rhetoric is no art at 
all but more of a knack, like cookery. This the sophists find most insulting. 
During the remainder of the dialogue Socrates proceeds to demonstrate 
through a dialogue with Polus, the upstart sophist, and Callicles, the most 
corrupt and, hence, dangerous sophist, that the sophists cannot teach 
justice and virtue to their ignorant pupils as Gorgias had claimed, because 
51 
they are ignorant of those things themselves. Rhetoricians are ignorant of 
the most important things in human life. He compares rhetoricians with 
tyrants and claims that rhetoricians can serve no just purpose in the polis 
because of this ignorance. In fact, they are most dangerous to the polis 
because of this coupling of their power at persuasion with their ignorance 
and lack of concern about the highest human things. It is easy to see from 
this why the sophists so detested Socrates. 
Having briefly touched on the major elements of the life of Platonic 
Socrates that are essential for comprehending the topic under discussion, 
one can now turn to the events surrounding his death at the hands of the 
Athenian polis. In the Apology of Socrates Plato presents an account of the 
trial of Socrates. In fact, what Plato presents is not a "full transcript" of 
the trial (not even a dramatised one), but rather he gives us only the 
speeches made by Socrates and not those of his accusers. He does tell us 
something about what the accusers said but only because Socrates refers to 
those speeches in his own address to the jury. All of the accusers were ex-
cellent speakers-apparently rhetoricians. From what Socrates says to the 
court it becomes obvious that he was formally charged with two crimes: cor-
rupting the youth of Athens and impiety. The second charge was actually in 
two parts: not honoring the gods of the city and introducing new gods or 
spirits into the city of Athens. Quite obviously the two major charges are 
related. 
During the course of his "defense" Socrates chooses to divide the 
charges made against him into two separate categories. In the first of these 
categories are the old charges-those that have been persistently leveled 
against him over a period of years by the sophists and poets of the polis. 
These old charges include making the stronger argument appear the weaker, 
being a meddler in the affairs of others, and prying into things under the 
earth and in the heavens. When speaking on his own behalf Socrates 
devotes most of his attention to these old charges rather than the particular 
"crimes" for which he stands indicted. Those "crimes" he is brought to 
court for at this time he calls the new charges and all but ignores them. With 
regard to the old charges Socrates does identify at least one source of these 
false claims made against him: 
I went to one of those reputed to be wise, supposing that there, if 
anywhere, I would refute the divination and show the oracle, "This 
man is wiser than I, but you declared that I was." So I considered this 
man thoroughly-I need not speak of him by name, but he was one of 
the politicians-and when I considered him and conversed with him, 
men of Athens, I was affected something like this: it seemed to me that 
this man seemed to be wise, both to many other human beings and 
most of all to himself, but he was not. And then I tried to show him 
that he supposed he was wise, but was not. So from this I became 
hateful both to him and to many of those present. 
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At any rate, as I went away, I reckoned with myself: "I am wiser 
than this human being. For neither of us is likely to know anything 
noble and good, but he supposes he knows something when he does not 
know, while I, just as I do not know, do not suppose I do. I am likely 
to be wiser than he in just this little something; that what I do not 
know, I do not suppose I know." 
From there I went to someone else, one of those reputed to be 
wiser than that man, and these things seemed to me to be the same. 
And there I became hateful both to that man and to many others. 
After this, then, I kept going to one after another, all the while 
perceiving with pain and fear that I was becoming hateful. (Apology, 
2lb-2le) 6 
As we saw in Gorgias Plato gave an account of one of these encounters 
which demonstrated how much these sophists must have come to hate 
Socrates ·as he moved about the city exposing them. The bitter exchange that 
took place in that dialogue was apparently only one of several such 
encounters. 
With regard to the new charges brought by individuals present in the 
court, Socrates only attempts to show how ludicrous these charges actually 
are. He manages to get Meletus, one of his accusers, to assert that, while 
only Socrates purposely corrupts the youth of Athens, all other Athenians 
help to make those youth better: 
(Socrates) Then all Athenians, as it appears, make them noble 
and good except me, and I alone corrupt them. ls this what you are saying? 
(Meletus) I do say these things, most vehemently. (Apology, 25a) 
This passage is particularly ironic when you consider the purpose to which 
Socrates devoted his life, according to Plato. It is even more ironic when 
one considers that Socrates was, in fact, convicted of the charges brought 
against him. But irony is a constant presence in the life of Socrates and the 
writings of Plato. 
Socrates does not really defend himself against the charges made 
against him by Meletus and his cohorts. Instead he simply instructs the jury 
that, if he is to be found guilty by them, it will not be on the basis of these 
new charges brought in court and the paucity of evidence which accom-
panies them but on the basis of the prejudice against him which stems from 
those old charges. After trying to instruct and persuade the jury of the cor-
rectness of his way of life in lieu of a genuine effort at defense, Socrates is 
found guilty by the jury of 500 Athenians by 30 votes. His obvious lack of 
repentence for his lifestyle no doubt weighed heavily on the final outcome. 
At this stage of the trial Socrates is once again called upon to address the 
jury-this time with regard to sentencing. Under Athenian law both the ac-
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cuser and the convicted are required to propose punishments for the tr ans-
gressor against the polis. Meletus had proposed the death sentence for 
Socrates. In addressing the court with regard to his sentence Socrates vir-
tually assures that he will be sentenced to death. He begins by stating that he 
believes that he did no wrong and that his sentence should, therefore, be a 
sort of reward rather than a punishment. He says that the city of Athe ns 
should require that he continue to live the life that he has been liv-
ing-engaging in dialogue with the young men of Athens and seeking to ex-
pose ignorance and untruth wherever it exists. In addition, the polis sho uld 
provide for his sustenance in return for this service to the city. Bear in mind 
that what he proposes as his sentence is the very action for which he has just 
been condemned by this same jury. He also tells the jury that, if he is allowed 
to live, he will continue to do what he has been doing in the past. He also re-
jects exile, since only in Athens was he free to follow the dictates of his con-
science (at least until now he had been). Finally, he offers a small fine which 
he can pay as an alternative sentence or a moderate fine which his friend s 
could pay. Even in making these proposals he shows no remorse, an d the 
jury which convicted has little choice but to condemn. 
The jury condemns Socrates to death, and, after that final decisio n is 
reached, Socrates is permitted to address the court for one last time. He 
concludes the trial with the following remarks: 
But it is clear to me that it was now better for me to be dead and to 
have left troubles behind. Because of this, the sign also nowhere turne d 
me away, and I at least am not very vexed at those who voted to con -
demn me and at my accusers. And yet it was not with this thought that 
they voted to condemn me and accuse me: they supposed they would 
harm me. For this they are worthy of blame. 
This much, however, I beg of them: When my sons grow up , 
punish them, men, and pain them in the very same way I pained you , if 
they seem to you to care for money or anything else before virtue. And 
if they are reputed to be something when they are nothing, repro ach 
them just as I did you: tell them that they do not care for the things 
they should, and that they suppose they are something when they are 
worth nothing. And, if you will do these things, we will be treate d 
justly by you, both I myself and my sons. 
But now it is time to go away, I to die and you to live. Which of us 
goes to a better thing is unclear except to the god. (Apology, 41d-4 2a) 
The lack of remorse about what he had done for the youth of Athe ns 
becomes even clearer in his final public speech-he had treated the sons of 
Athens as he would have the other Athenians treat his own sons. Socrates 
had led a life which attempted to turn the best of souls toward the highest 
rather than the lowest goals that men could achieve. 
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The central theme in the preceding analysis has been the dedication of 
Socrates to the task of turning the souls of the young men of Athens toward 
the 'good' and the 'just.' Secondary themes were the importance of this task 
and the danger involved for the one who attempted to perform it (Socrates). 
At this point, it would not be surprising to hear someone ask, "How is this 
relevant to the twentieth century or to political scientists of the present 
day?'' Perhaps the easiest answer to challenges of this type is to say, 
"Relevance does not concern me; I am simply a scholar trying to under-
stand the thought of another human being." Whether or not this response is 
sufficient in this case need not be debated, since that is not the answer that 
will be given. It seems to the author that the preceding considerations have 
or should have relevance for all engaged in the teaching of America's youth 
(or the youth of any polity, for that matter). However, it seems to be 
especially significant for those of us who teach political and social sciences. 
Those of us who teach political science or the humanities or social 
sciences, in general, seem to be serving the sentence that Socrates would 
have proposed for himself as first choice at his trial-to continue engaging 
in dialogue with the best young people of the polis and to have his 
sustenance provided for by the state. This appears to be especially true for 
those who teach at state institutions, but even the faculty at private colleges 
derive many benefits from the government which make it possible for them 
to practice their art, science, or knack. At the same time, we fare better than 
Socrates had hoped, since we receive considerably more than mere 
sustenance for our efforts. Having taken up this task begun by Socrates, it 
seems only natural to ask how we are doing. It is also reasonable to apply 
the standards which were spelled out in the works of Plato when we attempt 
to answer this question. Are we as professors of political science turning 
souls toward 'the good' and 'the just'? Are we at least not like the sophists 
of Socrates' time? That is, do we at least not teach techniques of manipula-
tion and control to whomever wants to learn them and assume that our 
students either know the difference between right and wrong when they 
come to us or will somehow pick it up in the course of their studies although 
it is not really our job to teach it to them? I fear that the answer we must give 
for our profession is that we are more like the sophists than like Socrates. 
In an essay written in 1961 Howard White criticized the political 
science profession which had recently undergone a "behavioral revolution" 
for aiding in the manipulation of the American voters by teaching tech-
niques of manipulation to whomever would listen and selling or at least 
leasing our services to political candidates. 7 White explained that political 
scientists (or students of politics) had traditionally opposed both corruption 
and manipulation, but that the new science of politics was, in fact, teaching 
and, therefore, condoning new techniques of manipulation. Within a few 
years these techniques would evolve into a true art form, as Joe McGinniss 
was prompt to point out to us. 1 A year after White's controversial article 
appeared Leo Strauss published "An Epilogue" to Essays on the Scientific 
Study of Politics. Strauss took a similar position to that taken by his former 
student, Howard White, although he was less condemning in his tone. 9 
Strauss does not accuse political science of collusion or manipulation as 
White had. Strauss claims that the new political science, dominated by 
behavioralism, "fiddles while Rome burns." 10 He then says that it is excused 
because: "it does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome 
burns." 11 In other words, Strauss saw the problem with behavioralist 
political science as being one of ignorance rather than being diabolical. 
Of course, since the time these articles were written, a number of 
changes have taken place in our profession-the behavioral revolution has 
been replaced by the post-behavioral revolution, and the excesses of the 
former have been ameliorated by the latter. We now have regained our 
equilibrium and are back on the appropriate course. Or are we? Are we any 
better today than the sophists of fifth century Athens? Should we not 
perhaps re-examine what we are teaching? Are we turning souls at all or 
merely fiddling? Is merely fiddling enough? If we are turning souls, are we 
turning them in the right direction? Is merely fiddling better or worse than 
turning souls the wrong way? ls American society more or less helpful than 
Athens in turning souls the right way? Unfortunately, I have no definitive 
answer to these questions. However, if I have raised questions in the minds 
of others where they did not exist before or raised nascent doubts to the 
level of consciousness, perhaps I have served some purpose of relevance 
above and beyond simply trying to understand the thought of another 
human being. 
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